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Energy Conservation in the United States: Understanding its Role in Climate Policy
Gilbert E. Metcalf*
Abstract
Efforts to reduce carbon emissions significantly will require considerable improvements in energy intensity, the
ratio of energy consumption to economic activity. Improvements in energy intensity over the past thirty years
suggest great possibilities for energy conservation: current annual energy consumption avoided due to declines in
energy intensity since 1970 substantially exceed current annual domestic energy supply.
While historic improvements in energy intensity suggest great scope for energy conservation in the future, I
argue that estimates of avoided energy costs due to energy conservation are overly optimistic. Avoided costs are
likely to be significantly higher than estimates from recent energy technology studies suggest once behavioral
responses are taken into account.
I then analyze a data set on energy intensity in the United States at the state level between 1970 and 2001 to
disentangle the key elements of energy efficiency and economic activity that drive changes in energy intensity.
Rising per capita income plays an important role in lower energy intensity. Higher energy prices also are important.
Price and income predominantly influence intensity through changes in energy efficiency rather than through
changes in economic activity.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Efforts to significantly reduce carbon emissions as part of any national strategy to address
climate change will require considerable improvements in energy efficiency. A recent study by
the National Commission on Energy Policy and the Pew Center on Global Climate Change
(2004) emphasized the need for improvements in energy efficiency as an important short-term
strategy for reducing carbon emissions while waiting for more capital-intensive responses to
come on-line in the longer-term. Pacala and Socolow (2004) present “stabilization wedges,”
activities that reduce carbon emissions so as to achieve stabilization of atmospheric carbon
concentrations at 500 ppm. Each wedge has the potential to reduce 1 GtC/year after fifty years
and seven wedges are required for stabilization, according to the authors. They present fifteen
wedge options, four of which involve energy efficiency improvements and conservation. In fact,
the authors argue that “[i]mprovements in efficiency and conservation probably offer the greatest
potential to provide wedges” (p. 969). Energy efficiency improvements also factor into the Bush
Administration’s replacement of carbon emission targets with carbon intensity targets (carbon
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2emissions relative to GDP). In 2002, the administration called for a reduction in carbon intensity
of 18% over the decade. In a similar vein, the National Commission on Energy Policy (2004)
recommended greenhouse gas emission reductions through the use of carbon emission intensity
caps. In their proposal, the Commission recommends a gradual reduction in carbon intensity of
2.4% per year beginning in 2010. One of the key recommendations to contribute to this goal is
enhanced energy efficiency. The NCEP recommendations form the basis for the plan proposed
by Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) to reduce carbon emissions.1 Pizer (2005) makes an
economic and political economy case for intensity targets for carbon emissions.
Reductions in carbon intensity can be achieved in two ways: fuel switching and reductions in
energy intensity. Energy intensity is the amount of energy consumed per dollar of GDP (more
broadly, per unit of economic activity). I focus in this analysis on the economic forces affecting
changes in energy intensity. To appreciate the importance of improvements in energy intensity as
a contributor towards reducing reliance on fossil fuels, consider the following thought
experiment. Imagine that the United States had the same energy intensity in 2003 that it had in
1970. At that energy intensity, the United States would have consumed 186.8 quadrillion BTUs
of energy (or quads) in 2003. In actuality, the United States consumed 98.2 quads of energy in
that year. This thought experiment suggests that we “conserved” 88.6 quads of energy in 2003
through reductions in energy intensity. Table 1 compares these energy savings with domestic
energy production in that year.
Treating energy conservation as a supply substitute, Table 1 points out that it has held the
2003 United States’s requirement for fossil, nuclear, and other supplies to less than half the
amount had these economic changes not occurred. Of course, one cannot attribute all of the
reductions in energy intensity to conservation and efficiency activities. Some of the reductions in
energy intensity have come about due to shifts in economic activity (shifts from manufacturing,
for example, to services) that have nothing to do with energy considerations. But the experiment
is suggestive of the importance of energy conservation as a strategy for reducing energy
consumption in general and carbon emissions in particular.
The goal of this paper is to analyze in greater detail the sources of and potential for
improvements in energy intensity in the United States. Using state-level data on energy
consumption between 1970 and 2003, I investigate the role that income and prices play in
Table 1. Domestic Energy Supply in 2003
Source Amount (quads) Percentage of Total Supply
Fossil Fuels 56.4 35.4
Nuclear 8.0 5.0
Renewables 6.2 3.9
Energy Conservation Since 1970 88.6 55.7
Total 159.2 100.0
                                                 
1 While framed in terms of carbon intensity limits, the Bingaman proposal, as submitted as an amendment to the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (S.A. 868), in fact places a cap on carbon emissions but provides for a safety valve at
$7 per ton of CO2.
3influencing energy consumption. In addition, following Boyd and Roop (2004) I use a Fisher
ideal index number methodology to decompose changes in energy intensity into efficiency and
activity components. Efficiency refers to the reduced energy use per unit of economic activity
within a particular sector (e.g. industrial sector) while activity refers to the changing mix of
economic activity (shift from energy intensive economic activity towards non-energy intensive
economic activity).
This paper builds on Boyd and Roop’s work in several ways. First, my analysis focuses on
total energy consumption rather than consumption in the manufacturing sector alone. Moreover,
I construct and analyze indexes at the state level over a much longer time period. And unlike
previous work in this area, I use regression analysis to measure the impact of changes in
economic and climate variables on the components of changes in energy intensity.2
I find that improvements in energy efficiency are responsible for between 2/3 and 3/4 of the
decline in energy intensity since 1970. In addition, rising per capita income contributes to
declines in energy intensity, primarily through improvements in energy efficiency. Finally, the
price elasticity of energy intensity is between –0.1 and –0.6, again with price affecting energy
intensity primarily through efficiency gains.
2. THE POTENTIAL FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY
While policy interest in energy conservation is quite high, there are a number of unanswered
questions which bear on policy development in this area. First, what is the potential for energy
conservation to contribute to climate change mitigation? And second, how costly will enhanced
energy conservation be? As noted above in the thought experiment I described, energy
conservation appears to have enormous potential to reduce our reliance on carbon-based fuels.
Unfortunately researchers have taken widely diverging perspectives on the cost-effectiveness of
conservation enhancing measures. On the one hand, some analysts are enormously optimistic as
the following quotation suggests: “The overall economic benefits of these policies [to stimulate
energy conservation] appear to be comparable to their overall costs. The [Clean Energy Future]
policies could produce direct benefits, including energy savings, that exceed their direct costs (e.g.
technology and policy investments).” (Interlaboratory Working Group (2000), p. ES 1). On the
other hand, a German economist in his assessment of utility conservation programs notes that
“… conservation will not be a free lunch and will definitely not come cheap.” Wirl (2000), p. 106.
How do we reconcile these differing points of view? At the risk of gross simplification, energy
technologists tend to fall into the first group while economists into the second group. These groups
differ on three key dimensions. First, energy technologists generally focus on policies that
minimize energy use while economists on policies that maximize economic welfare. The
development of appliance energy standards illustrates the distinction. Appliance standards for
                                                 
2 Sue Wing and Eckaus (2004) decompose energy intensity at the national level for 35 industries and analyze the
drivers of efficiency and economic activity using results from estimating a quasi-fixed input cost model. While
based on a structural underlying production model, their decomposition is not exact and, more important, some
of the impact of changes in efficiency show up in their structural term making it difficult to determine through
which avenues energy prices affect energy intensity.
4energy consumption were developed in the 1980s by reviewing the range of possible technologies
and comparing the incremental purchase costs of more efficient appliances to their lower operating
costs. Standards were set to minimize the lifetime cost of the appliance. The choice of a particular
technology standard followed from the choice of a discount rate (to trade-off future savings
against current costs) as well as assumptions on use patterns that influence the future savings.
Such a policy may be welfare enhancing but ignores important factors that will affect the
welfare gains and losses. Heterogeneity in use, for example, influences the cost-benefit
calculation. Consider the standards for air conditioners. Someone living in a hot and humid
climate will be an intensive user and so likely benefit from an aggressive efficiency standard that
trades off considerable up-front incremental cost against large reductions in future energy bills.
Another person, however, may be only an occasional user of her air conditioner and so may find
that the much higher purchase price of an energy efficient air conditioner does not pay off in
future energy savings. There may also be heterogeneity in discount rates. High discount rate
households will not benefit as much from future energy savings and so can be adversely affected
by an overly aggressive energy efficiency standard. In effect, the efficiency standard is a
Procrustean policy that forces all to fit a single standard with concomitant economic efficiency
losses. Appliance standards may reduce energy use but may not maximize consumer well-being
conditional on a given reduction in energy use. In addition, it is also likely to be a regressive
policy given the well-documented higher discount rates for low-income households.3
The choice of discount rate is further complicated by issues of risk. Investments in energy
efficient capital are inherently risky. The payoff to the investment depends on future energy
prices which can rise (as we are now observing) or fall (as they did in the 1990s). Moreover, the
investments have an irreversible element; that is, they cannot be unwound without cost. This
combination can drive the required discount rate (or hurdle rate) for investment up thereby
delaying investment (viz. Hassett and Metcalf, 1996). Empirical evidence bears this out. A recent
study of Dutch Greenhouse energy-saving investments finds a hurdle rate 75% higher than
calculated in studies with no uncertainty (Diederen et al., 2003).
Second, while both groups focus on correcting market failures, the first group also puts great
emphasis on the role of market barriers. To quote a leading energy researcher, “‘Market barriers’
refer to obstacles that are not based on market failures but which nonetheless contribute to the
slow diffusion and adoption of energy-efficient innovations” Brown (2001). These include
incomplete information, low priority of energy issues, capital market barriers, and incomplete
markets for energy efficient products. An economist would characterize many of these issues as
unmeasured costs. Information acquisition is costly. A market barrier example that is often cited
is the periodic electricity bill that consumers receive. Continuous time awareness of electricity
use and cost, it is suggested, will spur conservation. But experimental evidence suggests that
instantaneous monitoring has, at best, modest conservation impacts (see Matsukawa, 2004). Thus
it is not clear how much we can achieve with information programs. That consumers place a low
priority on energy issues also speaks to the costs of information acquisition. To quote from the
                                                 
3 Sutherland (1994) makes a similar argument for utility conservation programs.
5Clean Energy Future study, “energy efficiency is not a major concern for most consumers
because energy costs are not high relative to the cost of many other goods and services.”
(Interlaboratory Working Group (2000), p. 2.13). This is not to say that we should ignore market
barriers. But we should be careful to assess the appropriate role for government. Information is a
public good and so likely to be underprovided in the private market. On this ground alone, there
is likely to be an important role for government to play in providing information.4
Third, while economists take into account behavioral responses to policy programs, energy
technologists tend to ignore them. As the lead authors of the Clean Energy Future study
acknowledge, “as an engineering economic study, the CEF analysis is unable to incorporate the
full impact of market-wide behavioral responses to policies” Brown et al. (2001). The three major
behavioral issues are free riding, rebound, and moral hazard. Free riding refers to fact that when a
conservation incentive program is offered, it is taken up not only by agents who would not have
engaged in the conservation activity in the absence of the program, but also by agents who would
have taken up the activity regardless of the program. The result is that any assessment of the
program will overestimate the energy savings resulting from the program or— equivalently
—underestimate the cost per unit of energy saved from the program. A recent RAND study finds
significantly higher costs of avoided electricity in Demand Side Management (DSM) programs
than utility estimates, a difference they attribute to free-riding (Loughran and Kulick, 2004). The
study estimates the cost of avoided electricity from DSM at $0.14 to $0.22 or $0.06 to $0.12
(depending on the study group) as compared to utility estimates of $0.02 to $0.03 per kWh.
Similarly a recent Dutch study estimates that free-riders constitute nearly 50% of subsidy
recipients from an energy efficiency subsidy program directed at businesses (Blok et al., 2004).
The rebound effect is simply a restatement of the law of demand: when prices fall, demand
rises. Higher fuel efficiency standards for automobiles, for example, lower the cost of driving.
This, in turn, increases the demand for driving. A recent survey suggests rebound for residential
(and transportation) sectors between 10 and 30% (Greening et al., 2000).5
Finally, the presence of moral hazard influences policy design. Investors may delay
investments to take advantage of prospective investment subsidies. If we cannot distinguish
marginal investors from free-riding delay investors, an optimal subsidy scheme may be to focus
a subsidy on the latter group to encourage speedier investment (Wirl, 1999). An additional
implication of Wirl’s result is that it may be preferable to direct energy efficiency subsidies to
energy intensive consumers (e.g. purchasers of hot tubs and heated swimming pools), a policy
outcome that many would find counterintuitive.
                                                 
4 New research in behavioral economics also suggests that there may be highly effective, low-cost interventions to
enhance energy efficiency. In another context that may be instructive for energy conservation, Beshears et al.
(2006) demonstrates a number of low-cost interventions that can raise private saving in pension plans. They find
that the default option for opting in or out of volunteer pension plans has a large effect on participation rates. In
the context of energy conservation, new home builders, for example, might be required to make energy efficient
capital the default option but allow home purchasers to opt for less efficient capital.
5 Small and Van Dender (2005) find a rebound effect of about 10%. Parry (2006) finds that the failure of CAFE to
raise driving costs contributes to it being dominated by other policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from
passenger vehicles.
6This review is not meant to throw cold water on energy efficiency as an element of a climate
change program. Indeed, as the Pew study cited earlier suggests, it will be an essential element in
any comprehensive climate change program But it should suggest caution in the face of claims
that energy efficiency will come at low or even negative cost. I next turn to a review of energy
consumption trends in the United States followed by an analysis of energy intensity
improvements in the United States at the state level to see what we can learn from the experience
of the past thirty years.
3. BACKGROUND ON ENERGY CONSUMPTION TRENDS
Figure 1 shows energy consumption in the United States from 1900 through 2004.6 Energy
consumption has risen sharply over the century at an annual growth rate of 2.51% per year.
Growth rates were higher prior to 1970 (3.66% between 1900 and 1930 and 3.35% between 1931
and 1970) than after 1970 (1.08%).
Energy consumption per capita also grew dramatically over the century (Figure 2). Per capita
energy consumption rose from 100 million BTUs in 1900 to nearly 350 in 2004. The growth rate
between 1900 and 2004 was 1.19%. Again, the growth rate in the pre-1970 era was much higher
(2.0%) than in the post-1970 era (0.04%).
Figure 3 shows energy growth per dollar of GDP.7 Energy intensity peaked in 1917 at 35
thousand BTUs per dollar of GDP ($2000) and has gradually declined to its current level of 9.3.8
I will focus most on this relationship given the current interest in reducing carbon intensity in
United States policy. The initial growth of energy intensity can be explained, according to
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Figure 1. U.S. Energy Consumption.
                                                 
6 Data prior to 1949 are taken from Schurr and Netschert (1960) and exclude fuel wood consumption. Data for 1949
and later are taken from Energy Information Administration (2004). Energy consumption is in quads (quadrillion
BTUs).
7 GNP is used for the pre-1929 data.
8 If animal power were included, the peak might occur sooner.
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Figure 2. U.S. Energy Consumption Per Capita.
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Figure 3. Energy Consumption Per Dollar of Real GDP.
Schurr and Netschert (1960) by the electrification of the country that began in earnest at the turn
of the century and contributed to rapid growth in manufacturing. By 1920, however, the
improved thermal efficiency associated with electricity combined with a shift from coal to
petroleum as well as increasing productivity led to a turning point and the beginning of a long
and gradual decline in energy intensity.
An important point emerging from Figure 3 is that improvements in energy intensity are not
entirely a post-oil shock phenomenon. While energy intensity fell at a rate of 1.9% after 1970, it
was falling at a rate of 0.9% between 1931 and 1970. The acceleration in the rate of decline
following the 1970s oil shocks suggests the sensitivity of energy intensity to economic forces.
I next turn to an econometric analysis to further investigate the underlying forces driving this
decline.
84. DECOMPOSING ENERGY INTENSITY INTO STRUCTURAL AND EFFICIENCY
EFFECTS
Energy intensity (et) is a function of energy efficiency and economic activity. Specifically,
 
e
t
 Et
Y
t
=
E
it
Y
it




Y
it
Y
t



i  eitsit (1)
where Et is aggregate energy consumption in year t, Eit, energy consumption in sector i in year t,
Yt is GDP in year t, and Yit is a measure of economic activity in sector i in year t. Note that
energy consumption in the sectors must sum to aggregate energy consumption but the measures
of economic activity need not sum to GDP (indeed, they need not be in the same units).
Equation 1 simply states that aggregate energy intensity is a function of sector specific energy
efficiency (eit) and sectoral activity (sit).
Decomposing changes in energy intensity into components based on improvements in energy
efficiency and changes in economic activity became a major research topic beginning in the mid-
1970s.9 Ang and Zhang (2000) note that early researchers calculated the importance of changes
in economic activity by computing energy intensity in a given year holding sectoral energy
intensities constant. Differences between this hypothetical energy intensity and measured energy
intensity were attributed to changing economic activity. Boyd et al. (1987) were the first to use
index number theory to provide a theoretically based decomposition. They used a Divisia Index
number methodology and like earlier methodologies (which were essentially based on a
Laspeyres Index), these decompositions had residual terms which could account for a
considerable degree of the variability in the underlying index of energy intensity change.10
Research in this area has increased sharply with Ang and Zhang noting that their 2000 survey
found 124 studies, up from 51 in their 1995 survey.
Index number theory has a long history in economics with Irving Fisher being a key contributor
to the literature. Fisher (1921) identified two properties that he argued an index number should
satisfy. First, “[t]he formula should work both ways as to the two factors, prices and quantities.”
And second, it “should work both ways as to time.” (p. 534, italics in original) The first property
(known as factor reversal) is equivalent to perfect decomposition (i.e. no residual). The second
property means that an index computed between, say 1970 and 2000 should be the inverse of the
same index computed between 2000 and 1970. Fisher proposed what has become known as the
Fisher Ideal index which satisfies both these properties. This index is the geometric mean of the
Laspeyres and Paasche indexes. Boyd and Roop (2004) use this index as the basis for an exact
decomposition of changes in energy intensity into changes in energy efficiency and economic
activity. I use this approach at both the national level and at the state-level in this study.
Denoting e0 as the aggregate energy intensity for a base year, we can construct an energy
intensity index as et/e0. Following Diewert (2001), it can be shown that we can accomplish this
decomposition if 1) we can construct sectors that account for all energy use in the economy
                                                 
9 Ang and Zhang (2000) provide a survey of this literature. My discussion of this literature draws on their survey.
10 Greening et al. (1997) compare six different decomposition methodologies on the basis of their residuals.
9without overlap (i.e. a partition); and 2) there exists a set of economic activity measures (Yit) with
which to construct a measure of energy intensity. Note that these economic activity measures do
not need to form a partition.
To construct the Fisher Ideal index, I first construct Laspeyres and Paasche composition and
efficiency indexes. The Laspeyres indexes are:
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and the Paasche indexes are
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The Laspeyres indexes use a base period fixed weight while the Paasche indexes use an end
period. The Fisher Ideal indexes are then given by:
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As noted above, Fisher (1921) showed that his ideal index satisfied perfect decomposition of an
expenditure index into a price and quantity index. In our context, a Fisher ideal index provides a
perfect decomposition of an aggregate energy intensity index into economic activity and
efficiency indexes with no residual:
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This is a very attractive property for an energy intensity index since other intensity indexes have
residual terms that make difficult an interpretation of the relative importance of compositional
effects and efficiency effects.
This decomposition suggests a way to attribute changes in energy consumption arising from
improvements in energy intensity. Recall that my thought experiment in the Introduction suggested
energy savings of 88.6 quads of energy in 2003 given the improvements in energy intensity
between 1970 and 2003. Using my notation from this section, this change in energy (
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where tEˆ  is the level of energy consumption that would have occurred had energy intensity
remained at 1970 levels and the first equality in the last line of (6) is a first order Taylor Series
approximation. Equation (6) gives us a way to decompose the change in energy use perfectly into
an efficiency and activity component. I will carry out this decomposition in the data using the
following equality:
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4.1 Analysis at the National Level
I first provide an example of the Fisher decomposition at the national level using data from
1970 through 2003. I partition aggregate energy use into residential, commercial, industrial, and
transportation sectors and use economic activity measures appropriate for each energy sector as
discussed in the next two sub-sections.11 Table 2 shows my sectors and summary statistics for
the measures of economic activity in that sector that I use for the decomposition as well as
summary statistics on sectoral energy efficiency.
Figure 4 shows the results of this decomposition analysis for the United States taking 1970 as
the base year for the analysis.12 Aggregate energy intensity in 2003 was 53% of its intensity level
Table 2. Sectors for Decomposition Analysis at National Level.
Economic Activity Sectoral Energy Efficiency
Sector Measure Mean Std. Dev.† Measure Mean Std. Dev.†
Residential
Aggregate Personal
Consumption Expenditures
($2000 in billions)
4,448 1,440 BTUs per dollar($2000) 4,090 861
Commercial Value Added in CommercialSector ($2000 in billions) 4,663 1,754
BTUs per dollar
($2000) 2,847 440
Industrial Value Added in IndustrialSector ($2000 in billions) 1,883 276
BTUs per dollar
($2000) 17,156 2328
Transportation Vehicle Miles Traveled(billions of miles) 1,953 550 BTUs per VMT 11,512 1,787
Total GDP ($2000 in billions) 6,597 2,003 BTUs/dollar ($2000) 13,333 2,717
† Standard deviation.
Data from 1970 to 2003. The industrial sector includes manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, and
construction. The commercial sector includes transportation, communication, wholesale and retail trade, finance,
services, and government.
Source: Energy consumption data from the Energy Information Agency. Economic data from Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Transportation data from Federal Highway Administration.
                                                 
11 The Energy Information Administration attributes electricity consumption to these four sectors based on usage.
The degree of disaggregation affects the relative importance of efficiency and economic activity changes. This
disaggregation, for example, obscures shifts from energy intensive manufacturing to non-energy intensive
manufacturing. Such shifts will show up here as efficiency improvements. I discuss this further below.
12 See Appendix Table A1 for the index numbers at the national level.
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Figure 4. Aggregate Energy Intensity.
in 1970. The activity index was 86% of its level in 1970 while the efficiency index was 61% of
its 1970 level. In other words, had the composition of economic activity not changed between
1970 and 2003, energy intensity would have been 61% of its 1970 level. The forty percent
improvement in energy intensity was due to improvements in energy efficiency. Similarly, had
energy efficiency been fixed at its 1970 levels for all sectors, changes in economic activity would
have led to a 14% reduction in energy intensity. This decomposition allows us to estimate the
impact of changes in energy prices and income on energy intensity holding constant either
changes in sectoral energy efficiency or economic activity.
Using equation (7), I can allocate the change in energy use (relative to the amount that would
have been consumed had energy intensity remained at its 1970 level) between efficiency and
economic activity. Based on this approach, roughly one-quarter of the 88.6 quads of energy
reduction arising from improvements in energy intensity can be attributed to changes in the
composition of economic activity and the remaining three-quarters to improvements in energy
efficiency.13 Figure 5 shows the contributions of improvements in energy efficiency and
compositional changes on energy savings between 1970 and 2003. Initial reductions in energy
consumption can be attributed almost entirely to improvements in efficiency.14 By 1990 changes
in economic activity were beginning to contribute substantially to energy savings with major
increases in the activity component around 1997.
                                                 
13 This is conditional on the particular choice of sectors in this analysis. To see whether finer disaggregation within
the industrial sector affects the results, I constructed Fisher efficiency and activity indexes for the manufacturing
sector disaggregating at the two-digit SIC level between 1974 and 1997 (data available from Energy Information
Administration at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/mecs/). Energy intensity ( energy consumption per dollar of real
value added in manufacturing) fell by the same percentage in manufacturing as it did in the economy as a whole
between 1974 and 1997. Based on my Fisher indexes for this disaggregation, improvements in efficiency were
responsible for 82% of the improvement in energy intensity and changes in economic activity for 18% as of 1997.
Thus it does not appear that I am imparting significant bias by failing to disaggregate the industrial sector further.
14 In fact, in some early years, changes in economic activity led to increases in energy consumption.
12
Activity
Activity
Efficiency
Efficiency
Year
E
ne
rg
y 
Sa
vi
ng
s 
(q
ua
ds
)
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
0
–10
Figure 5. Energy Savings Relative to 1970 Intensity.
4.2 Analysis at the State Level
To further investigate the forces contributing to changes in energy intensity, I next turn to an
analysis at the state-level.15 Table 3 shows my sectors and measures of economic activity that I
use to construct the indexes. I maintain the same sectors (residential, commercial, industrial, and
transportation) but adapt the methodology for a state-level analysis in two ways. First, my
measure of energy intensity is the ratio of total energy consumption to personal income. I would
prefer to use gross state product (GSP) but GSP only go back to 1977 and the series has a
structural break in 1997 resulting from the shift from SIC to NAICS in that year. BEA
specifically advises against piecing together the pre and post-1997 data into a single time-
series.16 Second, I use earnings by place of work in the commercial (industrial) sector as my
measure of economic activity in the commercial (industrial) sector.
Table 4 provides summary statistics on the energy intensity index for the 48 continental states
for various years between 1960 and 2001. Several facts emerge from this table. First,
(unweighted) average energy intensity has been declining at a 1.2% annual rate between 1960
and 2001. Not surprisingly, the decrease was more rapid in the ‘70s and ‘80s given the oil price
shocks of 1973 and 1979. Second, the variation in intensity across states is rising. The coefficient
of variation, for example, doubles between 1970 and 2001. Third, while some states have
reduced their energy intensity dramatically (Rhode Island’s intensity fell by nearly 57% between
1960 and 2001), other states have failed to reduce their energy intensity at all (North Dakota’s
intensity increased by nearly 10% over this period). Figure 6 shows the changes in energy
intensity for the eight states with the largest and smallest declines in energy intensity across this
period. Not only are the trends different, but the patterns of change are different. Explaining this
variation across states is a major focus of the econometric analysis below.
                                                 
15 An additional reason for a state-level analysis is provided by Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2005). They find that
carbon emission predictions are more accurate when built up from state-level predictions than when constructed
at the national level.
16 One result of this change in definition is that a measure of national energy intensity built up from state-level data
differs somewhat from the intensity measures reported earlier in the paper. Aggregating from the state-level,
energy intensity in 2001 is 62% of its 1970 value, as compared to 53% using national data. Trends, however, are
unaffected by the change and the correlation between the two time series between 1970 and 2001 is 0.99.
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Table 3. Sectors for Decomposition Analysis at State Level.
Economic Activity Sectoral Energy Efficiency
Sector Measure Mean Std. Dev.† Measure Mean Std. Dev.†
Residential
personal income
($2000 in billions)
105.4 131.9
BTUs per dollar
($2000)
3,018 832
Commercial
earnings by place of work
in commercial sector
($2000 in billions)
53.0 72.8
BTUs per dollar
($2000)
4,227 961
Industrial
earnings by place of work
in industrial sector
($2000 in billions)
26.0 28.9
BTUs per dollar
($2000)
23,014 18,355
Transportation
Vehicle Miles Traveled
(billions of miles)
34.2 38.0 BTUs per VMT 11,576 2,906
Total
personal income
($2000 in billions)
105.4 131.9
BTUs per dollar
($2000)
14,721 6,812
† Standard deviation.
Data from 1960 to 2001 for the 48 continental states. The industrial sector includes manufacturing, agriculture, forestry,
fishing, mining, and construction. The commercial sector includes transportation, communication, wholesale and retail
trade, finance, services, and government. Sectoral energy efficiency summary statistics weighted by personal income.
Source: See Table 2.
Table 4. State-Level Energy Intensity.
Year Mean S.D. Min Max Annual Change (Cumulative) Annual Change (Decade)
1960 1.000 0.0 1.000 1.000 – –
1970 0.977 0.098 0.774 1.390 –0.23% –0.23%
1980 0.835 0.091 0.584 1.002 –0.90% –2.02%
1990 0.713 0.129 0.474 1.178 –1.12% –1.57%
2001 0.615 0.127 0.433 1.098 –1.18% –1.34%
Author’s calculations.
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Figure 6. State Level Intensity Trends.
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Next I disaggregate these trends into efficiency and activity components. Table 5 provides
summary information on the energy efficiency index. Energy efficiency worsened between 1960
and 1970. Holding economic activity constant, changes in efficiency led to a 0.2% per year on
average increase in energy consumption relative to economic activity in the states. This trend was
reversed in the 1970s which saw a 1.1% per year improvement in efficiency. Efficiency continued
to improve though at a declining rate in the 1980s and 1990s. As with overall energy intensity, the
variation in efficiency improvements increasingly varied across states over time with the
coefficient of variation more than doubling between 1970 and 2001. Finally, a number of states
experienced declines in energy efficiency (holding economic activity constant). North Dakota’s
index rose by 44% between 1960 and 2001, an annual increase of 0.9%. Figure 7 shows the
changes in the efficiency index for the states with the largest and smallest declines in their index.
Table 6 provides information on the economic activity index. There is much less variation
over time in the reduction in energy intensity due to changes in economic activity relative to the
variation in energy intensity or in the energy efficiency index. There is also less variation across
the states at any point in time. While the coefficient of variation doubles between 1970 and 2001,
it is roughly one-third the coefficient of variation in any given year for the energy efficiency
index. Figure 8 shows the change over time in the structural index for the four states with the
largest and smallest changes in the index respectively.
Table 5. State-Level Energy Efficiency Index.
Year Mean S.D. Min Max Annual Change (Cumulative) Annual Change (Decade)
1960 1.000 0.0 1.000 1.000 – –
1970 1.019 0.108 0.826 1.535 0.19% 0.19%
1980 0.909 0.117 0.621 1.253 –0.48% –1.14%
1990 0.819 0.164 0.535 1.417 –0.66% –1.04%
2001 0.736 0.163 0.506 1.442 –0.74% –0.97%
Author’s calculations.
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Figure 7. State Level Efficiency Trends.
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Table 6. State-Level Energy Activity Index.
Year Mean S.D. Min Max Annual Change (Cumulative) Annual Change (Decade)
1960 1.000 0.0 1.000 1.000 – –
1970 0.960 0.034 0.861 1.023 –0.41% –0.41%
1980 0.922 0.052 0.712 1.008 –0.41% –0.40%
1990 0.874 0.055 0.750 0.992 –0.45% –0.53%
2001 0.840 0.060 0.692 1.092 –0.42% –0.36%
Author’s calculations.
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Figure 8. State Level Structural Trends.
As with the national data, we can measure the relative contributions of improved energy
efficiency and structural change to improved energy intensity and consider the variation across
the states. Table 7 reports summary statistics on the shares for the states in 2001. Efficiency
contributes to the roughly two-thirds of the decline in intensity between 1960 and 2001. I
excluded North Dakota and Wyoming from the table as they are significant outliers.17
Before turning to a regression analysis of variation in state-level energy intensity, I briefly
discuss the only other study of which I am aware that addresses state-level changes in energy
intensity. Bernstein et al. (2003) run fixed effects regressions at the state-level between 1977 and
1999 of energy intensity (in log form) on various variables (gross state product, energy prices,
Table 7. Efficiency and Activity Contributions to Changes in Intensity.
Share Due to: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Efficiency 64% 17% 28% 106%
Activity 36% 17% –6% 72%
Author’s calculations for 2001. These are unweighted averages. ND and WY excluded. Full data in Appendix table A2.
                                                 
17 Wyoming’s efficiency contribution is -258%. This state had a 5% decline in energy intensity but its efficiency
index actually rose by 14% while its structural index fell by 17%. As a consequence its share due to structural
change rose by 358%. There is one other major outlier. North Dakota’s intensity index rose by 10% with its
efficiency index rising by 44% and its structural index falling by 24%. Including these two states does not
change the average share contributions appreciably. It does drive up the standard deviation sharply.
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climate data, etc.) and compute a measure of “residual energy intensity,” the difference between
observed log energy intensity and predicted intensity (including observed variables and year
effects but not fixed effects). Residual energy intensity in their view “may contain useful
information about the role of policy in lowering energy intensity.” (p. 21) My dataset improves
on the Bernstein et al. dataset in several ways. First, it is a more comprehensive dataset running
from 1960 to 2001 (1970 to 2001 for regressions below using energy prices). Second, their study
uses gross state product as a measure of economic activity despite a structural break in GSP
occurring in 1997. Third, their residential and transportation energy intensity measures are
energy use per capita rather than consumption relative to a measure of economic activity. Fourth,
I use the Fisher ideal index decomposition to separate out efficiency and composition effects
explicitly. The advantage of the approach I propose is that compositional change may be driven
in part by energy price changes. I can test for this indirect effect of energy prices on improved
energy intensity by regressing the composition index on prices (along with other variables) to
measure the impact. Fifth, their study’s weather data are at the census region rather than state
level (as in my dataset).18
5. EMPIRICAL WORK
I next present results from various regressions of the different indexes on economic and
weather related variables. Under the assumption that states are price takers in energy markets, I
interpret these as energy demand-style regressions.19 I’ve included an energy price variable, per
capita income, climate data (heating and cooling degree days) and year effects (to capture
autonomous technological change effects along with other macro level impacts). Summary
statistics for the regression data are in Table 8. The energy price variable is the average weighted
price of energy in the state based on fuel uses as computed by EIA and includes taxes.
Table 9 presents results for the energy intensity index. The first column presents results from
a regression of the intensity index on the log of price, per capita income, log-per capita income
squared, and climate variables.20 The first three regressions include the current energy price only
and differ in their inclusion of fixed state and/or year effects. In the first regression there are
neither state or year effects. Energy intensity falls with higher energy prices with a semi-
elasticity (change in index due to a one percent change in energy price) of –0.144. A ten percent
rise in energy prices is associated with a 1.4 percentage point drop in energy intensity. In this
(and subsequent) regressions, energy intensity is falling with respect to income given the range
of income in the data set. Energy intensity is higher in colder climates (more heating degree days
(HDD)) with a statistically significant coefficient in the first three regressions. Finally, energy
intensity is lower in warmer climates.
                                                 
18 I am indebted to Maximilian Auffhammer for providing me with his state-level data on heating and cooling
degree days. Auffhammer obtained these data directly from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. See Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2005) for more information on these data.
19 I constructed a Hausman test for energy price exogeneity by running a two-stage least squares regression using a
synthetic energy price as instrument for the energy price. The instrument is the average of state energy prices of
those states adjacent to a given state in each year. Regression results are not appreciably changed by the use of
this instrument and I fail to reject price exogeneity at the 95% level.
20 The energy price is the average weighted price of energy in the state based on fuel uses as computed by EIA.
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Table 8. Summary Statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Intensity 0.772 0.149 0.433 1.390
Efficiency 0.860 0.155 0.505 1.757
Activity 0.898 0.065 0.628 1.131
Real energy price ($1982-84/million BTUs) 6.366 1.579 2.454 12.532
Real income per capita ($1982-84) 13087 2669 6758 24235
Heating degree days (HDD) (1000) 5.37 2.09 0.48 11.12
Cooling degree days (CDD) (1000) 1.06 0.77 0.07 3.85
ln(income per capita) 9.459 0.200 8.818 10.096
ln(income per capita)2 89.5 3.8 77.8 101.9
ln(heating degree days) 1.576 0.510 –0.742 2.409
ln(cooling degree days) –0.210 0.759 –2.617 1.347
ln(energy price) 1.821 0.247 0.898 2.528
Summary statistics on 48 continental states between 1970 and 2001 (1,536 observations).
Table 9. Semi-Log Intensity Regressions.
ln(price)
–0.144
(0.012)
–0.179
(0.006)
–0.588
(0.017)
–0.027
(0.018)
–0.493
(0.033)
ln(pricet–1) –– –– ––
–0.182
(0.026)
–0.016
(0.040)
ln(pricet–2) –– –– ––
.007
(0.026)
–0.043
(0.039)
ln(pricet–3) –– –– ––
–0.005
(0.026)
.007
(0.039)
ln(pricet–4) –– –– ––
.042
(0.026)
–0.027
(0.038)
ln(pricet–5) –– –– ––
–0.082
(0.016)
–0.062
(0.029)
ln(per capita income)
3.743
(0.984)
2.651
(0.495)
1.738
(0.402)
2.788
(0.577)
1.380
(0.485)
ln(per capita income)2
–0.220
(0.052)
–0.174
(0.026)
–0.120
(0.021)
–0.183
(0.030)
–0.102
(0.025)
ln(HDD)
.017
(0.009)
.107
(0.016)
.080
(0.015)
.056
(0.015)
.068
(0.015)
ln(CDD)
–0.018
(0.006)
–0.017
(0.007)
.000
(0.007)
–0.013
(0.006)
–0.003
(0.006)
Intercept
–14.70
(4.66)
–8.58
(2.34)
–4.08
(1.92)
–8.85
(2.75)
–2.07
(2.34)
permanent price change
–0.247
(0.009)
–0.635
(0.021)
Fixed Effects no yes yes yes yes
Year Effects no no yes no yes
Adj. R2 0.42 0.82 0.90 0.80 0.87
Including fixed state effects increases the size of the price coefficient a bit. Adding year
effects substantially increases the price coefficient from –0.179 to –0.588. It may be that the
exclusion of year effects forces the price variables to pick up the effect of nation-wide macro
shocks that are correlated with price changes. In addition, the sensitivity of energy consumption
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(and intensity) to price changes is likely higher at the state than at the national level given the
ability to shift economic activity among the states. It may be that price effects in regressions
without year effects are obscuring the impact of state-level competition that makes energy
consumption more sensitive at this lower level to price changes. The year effects are jointly
significant and their inclusion does not impart any bias to the price variables.
Energy prices likely affect energy intensity with some lag. The next set of regressions in
columns 4 and 5 of Table 9 provide results for current price plus five years of lags. More recent
price changes (either current or a first lag) have stronger impacts on intensity than do more
distant lags. When price coefficients are positive, the effect is modest. It may be more instructive
to consider the impact of a permanent price change. In both regressions reported, the response to
a permanent price change is comparable in magnitude to the regression in current price only and
precisely estimated.21
I report results from regressions with the efficiency index as the dependent variable in
Table 10. Regression results are similar to those from the intensity index regressions. Higher
income is associated with a lower efficiency index over the range of income in the sample. Price
effects are not substantially affected by the inclusion of state fixed effects but are significantly
Table 10. Semi-Log Efficiency Regressions.
ln(price)
–0.183
(0.013)
–0.170
(0.009)
–0.751
(0.025)
–0.115
(0.026)
–0.655
(0.050)
ln(pricet–1) –– –– ––
–0.130
(0.038)
–0.020
(0.061)
ln(pricet–2) –– –– ––
–0.020
(0.038)
–0.103
(0.059)
ln(pricet–3) –– –– ––
.020
(0.038)
–0.024
(0.059)
ln(pricet–4) –– –– ––
–0.000
(0.037)
.023
(0.059)
ln(pricet–5) –– –– ––
–0.001
(0.037)
–0.014
(0.045)
ln(per capita income)
6.161
(1.104)
5.500
(0.688)
3.172
(0.612)
3.333
(0.842)
0.152
(0.740)
ln(per capita income)2
–0.343
(0.058)
–0.317
(0.036)
–0.211
(0.032)
–0.209
(0.044)
–0.055
(0.039)
ln(HDD)
0.021
(0.010)
0.072
(0.022)
0.095
(0.023)
0.014
(0.023)
0.037
(0.024)
ln(CDD)
–0.016
(0.007)
–0.007
(0.010)
0.013
(0.010)
–0.003
(0.009)
0.012
(0.009)
Intercept
–26.40
(5.23)
–22.62
(3.25)
–9.38
(2.92)
–11.53
(4.02)
5.86
(3.57)
permanent price change
–0.246
(0.013)
–0.839
(0.032)
Fixed Effects no yes yes yes yes
Year Effects no no yes no yes
Adj. R2 0.33 0.60 0.74 0.55 0.69
                                                 
21 In all the sets of regressions, the coefficient on the permanent price change in regression with lagged prices is
larger than the estimate for regressions with current price only. This suggests the Le Chatelier Principle at work.
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larger when year effects are included. The long-run price effects are larger than the short-run
effects. Finally, the magnitude of the coefficients on the price variables are similar to those from
the intensity regressions.
A very different pattern emerges from regressions with the activity index as the dependent
variable (Table 11). The coefficient on price is considerably smaller in magnitude and often
positive in sign. Climate variables and income also have a much smaller impact on the mix of
economic activity and the fit of the regression is much poorer. Even with a five year set of price
lags, it appears that prices affect energy intensity primarily through changes in efficiency.
Summing up, it appears that rising income contributes to declines in energy intensity. Second,
the long-run semi-elasticity of energy intensity with respect to price is between –0.25 and –0.63
and that changes in energy price affect energy intensity through changes in efficiency more than
changes in the mix of economic activity.
It is straightforward to show that the elasticity of demand for energy with respect to price
equals the price coefficient from the intensity regression divided by the intensity index. With an
average state index level of 0.59 in 2001, the high-end price coefficient estimate implies a price
elasticity of demand of roughly –1. Bjorner and Jensen (2002) cite estimates from a survey by
Atkinson and Manning (1995) of median elasticity estimates of –0.5. Time series estimates—
often associated with short-run effects—tend to be lower (median of –0.4) and cross-sectional
Table 11. Semi-Log Activity Regressions.
ln(price)
0.025
(0.006)
–0.024
(0.005)
0.064
(0.013)
0.079
(0.015)
0.093
(0.027)
ln(pricet–1) –– –– ––
–0.080
(0.022)
–0.007
(0.033)
ln(pricet–2) –– –– ––
0.018
(0.021)
0.039
(0.032)
ln(pricet–3) –– –– ––
–0.019
(0.022)
0.026
(0.032)
ln(pricet–4) –– –– ––
0.048
(0.021)
–0.018
(0.032)
ln(pricet–5) –– –– ––
–0.081
(0.013)
–0.056
(0.024)
ln(per capita income)
–1.211
(0.519)
–1.739
(0.383)
–0.931
(0.323)
0.184
(0.475)
1.360
(0.403)
ln(per capita income)2
0.057
(0.027)
0.080
(0.020)
0.057
(0.017)
–0.018
(0.025)
–0.062
(0.021)
ln(HDD)
0.000
(0.005)
0.044
(0.012)
–0.004
(0.012)
0.051
(0.013)
0.042
(0.013)
ln(CDD)
–0.005
(0.003)
–0.011
(0.006)
–0.010
(0.005)
–0.008
(0.005)
–0.013
(0.005)
Intercept
7.24
(2.46)
10.17
(1.81)
4.59
(1.54)
0.78
(2.27)
–1.04
(0.225)
permanent price change
–0.034
(0.007)
0.076
(0.018)
Fixed Effects no yes yes yes yes
Year Effects no no yes no yes
Adj. R2 0.17 0.48 0.69 0.45 0.65
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estimates—often associated with long-run effects—higher (–0.8). My high-end estimates are for
permanent changes in energy prices and so should be compared with the cross-sectional
estimates and are on the upper range of these estimates.
Table 12 provides information for the top-ten energy consuming states in 2001. These ten
states accounted for over half the energy consumption in that year. The first section of the table
provides information on improvements in energy intensity since 1960. Texas had the greatest
decline in energy intensity with its 2001 value less than half its 1960 value. It ranked seventh
among the 48 continental states for improvements in energy intensity over that period. Relative
to a weighted average improvement of forty percent between 1960 and 2001 for the continental
states, the top-ten states varied between 30 and 50% in their energy improvement.
The state fixed effect reported indicates unmeasured and unvarying influences within the state
that affect the intensity index. Texas, for example, has a state fixed effect of –0.153. After
controlling for prices, income, and climate variation (as well as year specific effects), the average
predicted intensity absent the fixed state effect would be 0.153 higher than actually observed.
The fixed state effects are important in determining the relative gains across the states in energy
intensity between 1970 and 2001. Ignoring the fixed state effect, Texas drops from fifth in
energy intensity improvements among the forty-eight states to twenty-sixth over this time period.
Several states have large and positive fixed effects (CA, FL, NY) that increase their energy
intensity substantially. Two of the states (TX and PA) have large and negative state fixed effects.
The state fixed effect shifts the average (over time) energy intensity for the different states.
There are several possible reasons for variation in the fixed effect. One possibility is that states
may simply have cultural, political, or other propensities for energy conservation. A state that
had social or institutional rigidities that obstructed energy conservation efforts would have a
Table 12. Top 10 Energy Consuming States in 2001.
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TX 12.03 0.496 7 –0.153 26 0.620 11 –0.198 29 0.799 11 0.013 16
CA 7.85 0.538 13 0.168 5 0.603 9 0.204 4 0.892 41 0.000 41
FL 4.13 0.643 33 0.320 3 0.779 33 0.392 6 0.826 19 –0.029 30
NY 4.13 0.578 22 0.197 4 0.645 15 0.278 3 0.896 43 –0.039 45
OH 3.98 0.567 21 –0.068 24 0.702 21 –0.064 22 0.808 13 –0.016 27
PA 3.92 0.503 8 –0.113 17 0.663 19 –0.060 17 0.759 4 –0.078 33
IL 3.87 0.606 27 0.090 16 0.736 27 0.143 15 0.824 18 –0.039 37
LA 3.50 0.694 39 –0.074 44 0.885 45 –0.161 45 0.784 6 0.054 2
MI 3.12 0.642 32 0.015 30 0.708 23 –0.013 27 0.907 45 0.035 29
GA 2.88 0.681 38 0.124 21 0.812 37 0.114 23 0.839 23 0.018 20
FE: fixed state effect from fixed effect and year regressions. Rank is the rank order from lowest to highest. The adjusted
rank is the rank of the predicted index in 2001 from the regression excluding the fixed state effect.
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higher state fixed effect. Another possibility is that states may have made great gains in energy
conservation prior to 1970 and that gains after that time are more costly. Thus energy intensity
would not have fallen as much between 1970 and 2001 leading to a higher state fixed effect. The
data do not support this latter hypothesis. I ran a regression of the fixed effect from the intensity
index regression on the energy intensity in 1970 relative to energy intensity in 1960. If this
hypothesis were true, the coefficient estimate would be negative. In fact the estimated coefficient
is positive though not statistically significant (t-statistic of 1).
The pattern of rankings and fixed effects for the intensity index data and regressions are very
similar to those of the energy intensity regressions, a not surprising result given the regression
results suggesting the predominant role changes in energy efficiency play in affecting energy
intensity. In the same vein, the magnitude and variability of the fixed effects from the activity
index regressions are much smaller than for the efficiency index regressions.
How important are the price effects from these regressions? To get a feel for this, we can do a
back of the envelope calculation of the consequences of the recent increase in energy prices for
energy intensity. The most recent Short Term Energy Outlook from the Energy Information
Administration (2006) predicts that energy prices will rise by between 20 and 50 percent in real
terms between 2001 and 2007. Focusing on the regressions with fixed state effects but no year
effects, the price coefficients suggest that a fifty percent increase in real energy prices would
bring about a 7.3 percentage point decline in energy intensity on average relative to 2001. If
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Using the state average energy intensity of 0.59 for 2001 (weighted by energy consumption)
and a growth rate in real personal income of 14% between 2001 and 2007, energy use should be
1.6% higher in 2007 than it was in 2001. This is roughly ten percent of the increase that would
have occurred had the energy intensity ratio stayed the same between the two periods (14%).
Obviously, this is a crude calculation but suggests the magnitude of energy efficiency
improvements in response to price changes.
A second policy experiment we can consider is whether the Bush Administration reduction in
carbon intensity is feasible without substantial policy intervention. In regressions not reported
here, I added a time trend (and trend squared) to the regressions without year effects. The trend
coefficients suggest that absent changes in price, income, or weather conditions, energy intensity
will trend downward over this decade by between 3 and 4%.22
                                                 
22 Growth in income suggests we should observe a larger decline in energy (and thus carbon) intensity. In fact
carbon intensity fell by 16 percent between 1990 and 2000 suggesting that little policy intervention will be
required to achieve the Bush Administration’s goal of an 18 percent reduction in carbon intensity.
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6. CONCLUSION
This paper is a first cut at understanding the forces driving improvements in energy intensity
in the United States since 1970. It builds on a large literature in energy decomposition analysis in
two ways. First, it is the only analysis of changes in energy intensity at the state level using a
perfect decomposition methodology. Second, this study uses econometric methods to identify the
drivers of changes in efficiency and economic activity indexes.
I find that rising per capita income contributes to improvements in energy efficiency and
intensity and that prices also play a key role. Neither price nor income has an appreciable impact
on the mix of economic activities and—more importantly—changes in the mix of economic
activity are considerably less important than improvements in efficiency over this time period to
explain improvements in energy intensity. Unobserved state fixed effects vary substantially
across the states and suggest that state-specific cultural or institutional factors play an important
role in predicting the degree to which states may be able to reduce energy intensity in the future.
Understanding these state-specific influences is an important component of future research.
Finally, it is not clear why higher income should lead to lower energy intensity since I’m
controlling for the mix of economic activity in the efficiency regression. The reduction in energy
intensity as income rises is not simply a shift away from manufacturing to services (or some
other shift from energy using to energy saving technology) but rather something more intrinsic to
activities within each of the four energy consumption sectors. Conducting the type of
decomposition analysis that I’ve done in this study at a more disaggregated level is an important
area for future research to explore this question more deeply. This study, however, at the
minimum suggests that such an analysis is feasible and likely to be highly productive.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. U.S. Energy Intensity Indexes.
Year Intensity Activity Efficiency
1970 1.00 1.00 1.00
1971 0.99 1.00 0.99
1972 0.98 1.01 0.98
1973 0.97 1.01 0.96
1974 0.95 1.00 0.95
1975 0.93 1.00 0.92
1976 0.93 1.01 0.92
1977 0.91 1.01 0.90
1978 0.89 1.01 0.88
1979 0.87 0.99 0.87
1980 0.84 0.99 0.85
1981 0.80 0.99 0.81
1982 0.78 1.00 0.79
1983 0.75 0.98 0.77
1984 0.73 0.98 0.75
1985 0.70 0.97 0.73
1986 0.68 0.95 0.72
1987 0.68 0.95 0.71
1988 0.68 0.96 0.71
1989 0.68 0.95 0.71
1990 0.66 0.94 0.70
1991 0.66 0.93 0.71
1992 0.65 0.92 0.71
1993 0.65 0.92 0.71
1994 0.63 0.92 0.69
1995 0.63 0.92 0.69
1996 0.63 0.92 0.69
1997 0.60 0.91 0.66
1998 0.58 0.88 0.67
1999 0.57 0.87 0.66
2000 0.56 0.87 0.65
2001 0.54 0.86 0.63
2002 0.54 0.86 0.63
2003 0.53 0.86 0.61
See text for construction.
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Table A2. Efficiency and Activity Contributions to Changes in Intensity
State Efficiency Activity
WY –258% 358%
IA 28% 72%
ME 31% 69%
LA 33% 67%
WV 40% 60%
IN 43% 57%
NJ 43% 57%
SD 46% 54%
SC 48% 52%
NE 51% 49%
OK 54% 46%
GA 54% 46%
MS 55% 45%
MT 55% 45%
WI 56% 44%
AR 56% 44%
FL 57% 43%
PA 60% 40%
KY 60% 40%
AL 61% 39%
IL 61% 39%
OH 62% 38%
WA 65% 35%
ID 66% 34%
VA 67% 33%
NC 67% 33%
KS 67% 33%
NH 68% 32%
TX 68% 32%
MD 69% 31%
NV 71% 29%
TN 72% 28%
MN 72% 28%
NM 73% 27%
DE 74% 26%
CT 77% 23%
MI 78% 22%
OR 78% 22%
RI 80% 20%
NY 80% 20%
UT 81% 19%
CO 81% 19%
CA 82% 18%
MA 86% 14%
AZ 89% 11%
MO 94% 6%
VT 106% –6%
ND 392% –292%
Author’s calculations. See text for details.
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